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The Manifold Faces of Religion in Modern Societies:
The Case ofGermany and the USA
1. The New American Paradigm: A Modest Critique
Andrew Greeley
Introduction
»The Sociology ofAmerican Religion is undergoing a period of ferment... a paradigm shift
in process.« Thus does R. Stephen Warner (1993) begin a long and seminal article in the
American Journal of Sociology. Scarcely three years after the article, Warner's prediction
has been spectacularly fulfilled. A group of scholars, many of them young, some of them
on the faculties of Catholic universities (though not themselves Catholic), have swept all
before them, reduced to ashes Peter Berger's (1967) Sacred Canopy, dismissed Bryan
Wilson's (1966)claim that high levels of religious practice in the United States are proof of
secularization as senseless ideology, challenged European theories of secularization, refuted
attacks on their own methodology, and transferred their industrious work within their New
Paradigm from field Journals to the prestigious major Journals.
The most fundamental insight of the New Paradigm is that, Berger's »plausibility
structure« to the contrary notwithstanding, pluralism is good for religion because it forces
competition in an open market place of belief Systems. Those working in the New Para¬
digm embrace economic or quasi economic modeis and speak of »supply side« religion,
religion as »human capital,« religion as »rational choice.« They are not only resourceful
theorists but resourceful hunters of data and sophisticated analysts. One can no longer work
in the sociology of religion in the United States and indeed in the English speaking world
and ignore their New Paradigm. There is little reason to expect that the New Paradigm will
have an impact on the conviction of most American sociologists that religion is not socio-
logically important any more - dogmas rarely yield to evidence. Nonetheless they have at
least forced those sociologists who read the major Journals to be exposed to the possibility
that they might be wrong.
There are at least four reasons for the emergence ofthis New Paradigm:
1. The increasing popularity ofeconomic or »rational choice« modeis in American sociolo¬
gy has created a climate in which it seems perfectly natural to apply such modeis to the
study of religion.
2. The availability of data sets both the past have provided raw materials for detailed analy¬
sis as a Substitute for pontification about the impact ofthe various »-izations« on religion.
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Thus they practitioners of the new paradigm have established that in the United States
»urbanization« leads to higher rather than lower levels of religious practice. Finke and
Stark (1988) and Christiano (1987). The city is more sacred than the country.
3. The availability of survey data sets with time series responses have demolished predicti-
ons ofa decline in religion. Most notable among the data sets is the General Social Sur¬
vey which will celebrate its 25th anniversary next year. However, other sources including
the World Value Study and the International Social Survey program have also been use¬
ful to those working in the New Paradigm because they seem to demand a different ana-
lytic approach. Indeed, as we shall see, some ofthose working in the New Paradigm have
used the Values Study to argue against a decline in religion in Europe.They have expo-
sed the poverty of imagination and insight of the analysis which the official Interpreters
ofthe Value Study have presented. (Ester, Halman, de Moor 1993. For a contrary ap¬
proach see Whelan et al 1994).
4. Finally, the old paradigm failed the ultimate test to which a theory must be submitted: the
hypotheses it generated simply did not fit the data. In a data driven sociology such a re¬
sult creates a demand for new theory. Perhaps what is surprising is not that they theory
finally emerged in the early nineties, but that it did not emerge at least ten years earlier.
The old paradigm, however, is a theory in a different and more comprehensive sense. It
purports to know what religion is and to have accounted for ist decline. The fact of that
decline is taken for granted and rarely if ever substantiated save anecdotally. This decline is
taken to be the result of inevitable historical processes (modemization, urbanization, ratio-
nalization etc. etc.). Secularization is not a heuristic model but an accurate (and true)
description of a reality which everyone knows to be true. Many of the attacks on the New
Paradigm ignore its limited intent, assume that it purports to be as comprehensive as the old
paradigm, and talk right past it.
For those unfamiliar with »supply side« economics, the notion can best be illustrated by
the following example. Twenty years ago there was little demand for personal Computers.
The demand was created because a large supply of such Computers at reasonable prices mo¬
re or less suddenly became available. Instead of demand generating supply, supply genera¬
ted demand.
When they apply this model to religion, the »supply siders« (Most notably Rodney
Stark, Roger Finke, Lawrence Iannaccone and their associates) suggest that the demand for
religion (perceived and unperceived) is fairly constant and that variations in religious beha¬
vior must be attributed to the increase supply of religious institutions and functionaries
working in an unregulated market place.
Finke, Guest, and Stark in a recent article (1996) summarize the theory: For a challen-
ging Synopsis of the Paradigm one might well tum to an aggressive article by Stark and
Iannaccone (1994) in which they dismiss the »secularization« theory as it applies to Europe.
They list seven propositions which encompass the principle assumptions ofthe New Para¬
digm:
1. The capacity of a single religious firm to monopolize a religious economy depends upon
the degree to which the State uses coercive force to regulate the religious economy.
2. To the degree that a religious economy is unregulated, it will tend to a very pluralistic.
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3. To the degree that a religious economy is pluralistic, firms will specialize.
4. To the degree that a religious economy is competitive and pluralistic overall levels of re¬
ligious participation will tend to be high. Conversely to the degree that a religious eco¬
nomy is monopolized by one or more state-supported firms, overall levels of participati¬
on will tend to be low.
5. To the degree that a religious firm achieves a monopoly, it will seek to exerts ins influ-
ence over other institutions and thus the society will be sacralized.
6. To the degree that deregulation occurs in a previously highly regulated society, the
society will be desacralized.
7. The relationship between the degree of regulation ofthe religious economy ands start-up
costs for a new religious Organization is curvilinear - declining as the State exerts less co¬
ercion on behalf ofa monopoly firm but rising again as fully developed pluralism produ-
ces a crowded marketplace of success and effective firms.
The notion that a State established church (or two State established churches as in Germany)
represents a »coercive« regulation ofthe religious economy may seem odd at first. It is cer-
tainly the case, however, as the supply-siders repeat over and over again, that established
churches are notoriously unsuccessful, that in fact they are not only monopolies but lazy
monopolies.
Ifthe two authors are correct, then it would follow that deregulation ofthe religious mar¬
ket place (disestablishment) and religious mobilization by shrewd religious entrepreneurs
would create a religious »revival« in these countries. If the clergy in these countries, they
imply, were not salaried government bureaucrats but had to be responsive to their people in
order to survive, religious mobilization might well follow. One could remark that the Fede-
ral Republic could be an ideal natural experiment for such a theory. If the State abandoned
its policy of financial support for religious institutions and the clergy (and hierarchy) had to
provide for themselves, would there be a religious »revival?« Would an increase in the reli¬
gious supply as the church and the clergy competed for support lead to an apparent increase
in religious demand.
Minimally, one must concede to these authors, that a religious monopoly, especially
when it becomes a lazy monopoly, is not in the long run an asset to institutional religion.
Patently the New Paradigm poses a challenge to European sociologists of religion and in¬
deed to all sociologists in Europe and North America. Like most new paradigms, the chal¬
lenge is so astonishing and so contentious that it is easy to simply ignore it. If one of the
measures of a successful paradigm is its capacity to provide an environment in which
further research becomes possible on issues which have not been addressed before or have
been addressed only peripherally, then the New Paradigm is already successful. It is unli-
kely that Sherkat would have asked the questions he so resourcefully addresses unless the
New Paradigm had provided a perspective within which he might work. Under the old pa¬
radigm there was not much point in wondering why someone chose, for example, to marry
within his own heritage and someone chose to marry across denominational lines. Such an
issue did not matter. Mixed marriages were merely one more indicator of »secularization.«
If religion was in a condition of irreversible decline, was that not a sufficient reason for
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ignoring religious boundaries at the time of marriage. That most people continued to marry
their own kind was simply evidence of culture lag.
Perhaps the most important merit ofthe New Paradigm is that it takes religion seriously
which the old paradigm never really did. Ifa phenomenon is about to disappear, there is no
real need to do much more than record ist disappearance. The New Paradigm makers loo-
ked around and saw that many people were in fact still religious, especially in that country
where the secularization theory said religion should have been most in retreat (and about
which Bryan Wilson said its high levels of devotion proved how secular the society was!).
They therefore chose to bracket the question of religious decline and study religious beha¬
vior as it existed. By so doing they have turned away from what was an intellectual dead
end and have launched a vigorous and creative ferment in the sociology of religion. The
link between what Finke calls religious regulation and low levels of religious practice is so
obvious one has to wonder why it has taken so long for someone to build a theory out of it.
Even those who are so angry at them that they can hardly conceal their anger, have been
forced to confront the New Paradigmists on their own terms. They have, I believe, changed
American sociology of religion permanently. As I have said before they are not likely to
change the attitude of most American sociologists towards religion or towards the sociolo¬
gy of religion. If the angel Gabriel appeared at high noon in front of William James Hall at
Harvard - or, for that matter, if William James himself should appear
- and announced that
religion did matter, it would have no impact on American sociology.
Indeed if that worthy angel should enter the hallowed precincts ofthe National Opinion
Research Center with the same announcement, pertinent religious questions would not ap¬
pear on NORC's questionnaires.
Whether the New Paradigm will be taken seriously by European sociologists remains to
be seen. Candidly, I wouldn't bet on it.
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2. Religion and Modemization in Comparative Perspective - David Martin's Theory
of Secularization reconsidered
Willfried Spohn
David Martin's general theory of secularization is the most elaborated historical-
sociologigal theory of the varying processes of secularization in the European Christian
civilization. However, Martin's theory has been rarely taken up in systematic ways-if so, as
a directly testable theory of present degrees of secularization in Europe, rather than in its
theoretical bases and historical comparative scope.
I myself have come across Martin's theory in my historical-sociological research on re¬
ligion, nation-building and class formation in 19th and 20th centuries Germany in an Euro-
